By preparation of the given job I once again have re-read "the Way to free economy" and have been satisfied by the head about privatisation. As to the head about stabilisation, it I cannot tell. If I could be transferred to that year on a time machine with all present thoughts, I completely would copy the head. In it some questions were considered, here I will stop on three of them. Time. In 1989 the Hungarian economy has faced a number of very serious macroeconomic problems for which decision rigid actions were required. It was clear, that their consequences will appear rather painful. There was a question on when them to carry out. In the book I recommended to undertake necessary steps quickly, within the next year or two years. This recommendation was saved and in Czech, both Polish, and Russian editions of the book and in a number of others. Main my then argument - opens the new chapter of history. During this moment freely selected government has the moral right to call society to make a sacrifice, justifying its necessity of correction of errors of the previous mode (especially that it is possible to correct quickly). In case of an inhaling of time people, it is fair or not, will start to assign fault for lacks and difficulties to the new democratic government. And today it seems to me, that my position was correct. Similar radical steps have been undertaken in Poland in 1990 during realisation of the program of L.Baltserovicha. In the first section of the given job I some times criticised the government of Czechia, but here I would like to give due V.Klausa's to government for boldness at acceptance of drastic measures in the field of a macroeconomic policy in 1991
As the citizen of Hungary I sincerely regret, that the government of my country this offer, and opposition has rejected it also has not supported. Their decisions depended on presence of political will, instead of from objective economic conditions. Leading political forces were afraid to do unpopular steps. Macroeconomic stabilisation has been postponed for some years, and corresponding measures have been realised only in 1995 when Hungary was on the verge of financial crash under the influence of the Mexican crisis. Simply reasonable councils was insufficiently. It was necessary, that Hungary has appeared on the brink of a precipice, only then the government has dared to undertake at the last minute the actions directed on prevention of crisis. The majority of experts converge that costs of the postponed stabilisation are exceeded much more by that would arise at its earlier realisation. It is not necessary to think, that the similar decision is accepted proceeding from purely rational, economic reasons. Here there are both ethical, and political dilemmas. It is a question of intertime distribution of losses and benefits and simultaneously readiness to pay the political price for acceptance of unpopular measures. Forecasts. My offers were based on certain forecasts of macroeconomic consequences of postsocialist transformation. They have appeared incorrect. I have not managed to expect deep recession in the countries with transitive economy and too optimistically estimated prospects of the future growth. I should recognize, that the forecasts made many my colleagues in Hungary and abroad, have appeared more realistic. I can blame myself because at my order there was an information on which basis it would be possible to predict a course of events is better. For example, I could read more attentively the own book "Socialist system" 22 and then the course of my reasonings would be the following. Heritage of socialist system - the extremely deformed structure "expenses - release" in economy. Correction of it needed creative destruction, but destruction proceeds quickly, and creation - slowly so the in itself balance of two processes assumed deep recession. In socialist system the special mechanism of coordination of various kinds of activity has been created. Though level of its efficiency was low, and in the end the mechanism in general hardly operated, it nevertheless till this time worked. At system change the old mechanism has been broken, but new, the market mechanism could not carry out all functions of coordination yet. In later "the neutral earth" and decomposition. The named changes together with a number of other factors have led to that in region the deepest recession in world economic history has burst. It was necessary to reconsider classical recipes of macroeconomic stabilisation before to hope for success any programs. What result can achieve fast actions? In my book the recommendation contained, offering to carry out the radical program of transformations at one time. Estimating the given advice I will lean against experience as Hungary, and other countries. Even today I do not reject idea of "package" of radical reformatory measures when a number of steps is undertaken simultaneously. Well made set of the verified measures is capable to restore balance at once in several areas of macroeconomic or, at least, to approach a national economy to tolerant degree (for example, having reduced deficiency of the current balance of payments or budgetary deficiency to comprehensible level). Now I would displace accent in this offer. It is too much attention in him it was given to that it is possible to reach quickly, realising "package" of radical measures, and it is not enough - to how to strengthen reached and to provide long-term improvement. It is difficult to achieve economic balance, but it is very easy to lose it again. Not once it seemed, that in Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Russia the macroeconomic situation is adjusted. Then the next shake-up followed: delay of rates of growth or even absolute deterioration of certain indicators. That growth was steady, the comprehensive programme reforms is necessary deep. My offers, expressly or by implication concerning budgetary restrictions, and are represented today quite reasonable, but I cannot excuse myself an error which was made also by many other things authors besides me, - I have paid insufficient attention to importance of carrying out of other reforms. It is easy to improve a budget status at one time, for example, having raised rates of taxes. But for long improvement of a situation carrying out of radical tax reform, expansion of base of the taxation, introduction of new taxes and efficient system of taxation are required. And it - only one, probably, more simple party of fiscal reform. Its other party - reduction of the State expenditure that means reorganisation of machinery of state and a financing of education, public health services and other spheres of social security. It is rather easy to declare national currency converted, but it is much more difficult to organise effective system of international payments, to adjust close connections between domestic and world bank systems and to guarantee observance of the international payment agreements. The problem of the given job does not include the detailed analysis of what elements of the program of E.Gaydar of 1992 were good, and what - not so. Here I can note the following only: the problem consisted not that Gaydar's government by acceptance of radical measures aspired to stop country slipping in hyperinflation abyss. The trouble (not unique, but main) consisted that in Russia has not been created институциональной systems for maintenance and strengthening of macroeconomic balance neither till this moment, nor after. Macroeconomic stabilisation - not separate fight, and infinite war. Blitzkrieg it not to win. Институциональные reforms can be spent only step by step, series of the big and small blocks. Today it is clear to me. I regret, that the given idea is not present in "the Way to free economy". Polemic of the beginning of 90th years has been connected with a choice between and "shock therapy". It was one of popular subjects for discussions in student's audiences at studying of courses on. Many students had to write about it in the examination jobs. It is represented to me, that the question has been put incorrectly and I am not going to to respond to it. It already contains criterion - speed. I am convinced, that, as though speed of transformations was important, it is not the main criterion of success. In those days many participants of postsocialist transformation were afflicted 2. Czechia warmly congratulated that it the first managed to privatise the economy most part. In Hungary private sector scales became comparable with Czech after two years, and in Poland - a minimum through three. Well also what? Transformations to a society is not jumps. Who will come the first - yet main indicator of success. The excessive accent for the speed leads to intolerance, aggression and self-confidence. "We can make everything, that we will want". The original irony consists that expression "mass privatisation" as a synonym of free distribution of the property and voucher privatisation back to expression "mass collectivisation", known of practice. Stalin did not wish to spend a lot of time for voluntary collectivisation. Using rough, ruthless violence, it has imposed to peasants the collective property for two-three years. I would not like to draw direct parallels. Fortunately, in 90th years there was no a violence. Changes have been carried out by softer means. Nevertheless similarity is available: submission of reform of the property to political ideas, fear before gradual changes, intolerance and obsession speed of transformations. Transition from socialism by capitalism should proceed organically. Otherwise also cannot be. This strange combination of revolution and evolution, the process based on a trial and error method, saving or liquidating old institutes and the testing, accepting or rejecting new. Thus something can occur very quickly, something - rather quickly or slowly. That is speed of various components of process of transformation will be. In some cases the one-stage decision of a problem, in others - changes is required. There are more important criteria, than speed of transformations. I will begin with the statement (not assumptions, but statements), that the capitalist system surpasses the socialist., that the more reliably the capitalism base from this follows, the it will be better to function in sredne - and long-term prospect. Thus, it is necessary to do an emphasis on strengthening and stabilisation of system and at the same time - on maintenance of steady economic growth, instead of to try to reach record rates of development.
