In Gibraltar our staff took places in the nastiest conditions from all in what we ever were for all war. Underground tunnels under a rock were a unique place for placing of our services. There we have established radio equipment with which help hoped to keep in contact with commanders of three desantiruemyh groups. An eternal darkness of these tunnels that here there partially dissipated weak electric lamps. In a vault there was a crude and cold dead air which, appear, did not react in any way to the strengthened murmur of electric fans. Subsoil waters filtered through vaulted ceilings, and large falling drops is melancholy and methodically counted seconds of infinite, almost intolerable expectation of the beginning of operation. Other place in which we could take places, was not. In November, 1942 the allied states did not possess any pjatachkom a land in all Western Europe, except for the Gibraltar fortress, and around Mediterranean sea they still had only Malta. English Gibraltar has made possible intrusion into Northwest Africa. The small airdrome at early stages of intrusion served in Gibraltar not only operative base of aircraft of cover, but also intermediate airdrome for the planes flying from England on the African continent. Some weeks prior to disembarkation of landings it has been hammered by fighters; literally each inch of the earth for technics and fuel placing was used. And all it stood on a kind as it be no point to carry out actions for masking. Worse that, the airdrome was directly at the border along which the fence from a barbed wire has been stretched only. In the political plan Spain tended to "axis" powers, therefore she has for certain allowed to stand to any number of their agents at a fence and to observe of an event. Every day we waited for a large touch of enemy bombers, but it was not. It surprised and puzzled us.

Unique explanation of such behaviour could be that, the measures taken by us on introduction of the opponent in заблуждение* have possibly, well worked. We knew, that long before intrusion of the country of powers of "axis" learn about the amplified activity from Gibraltar, but we hoped, that the opponent will come to conclusion, that we prepare new, unusual attempt on plan to deliver a reinforcement on Malta which was many months in a distress.

And nevertheless, despite threat of an air attack, gloomy surrounding conditions and thousand other unforeseen circumstances, contrary to our calculations easily able to arise in this huge mechanism which should come to movement, in the staff the mood was vigorous. Infantrymen, seamen, the pilots who were going to here, were in a status of excitation which invariably arises at the person when there are behind months of persistent preparations and expectation of an outcome of the courageous enterprise begins.

Intensity was However, felt also. It was natural. After all in some hours allies learn about destiny of initial phases of the first joint offensive operation in war. Except for irresolute campaigns which proceeded in the Western desert here already whole two years, and battles on island Guadalcanal, all over the world allies were able not undertake on a land something bolshee, than purely defensive efforts. And even these our defensive efforts have been saddened by tragical defeats from which Dunkirk, Bataan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sura-baja and Tobruk served us as a heavy reminder.

When we whiled away hours, pacing on caves under the Gibraltar rock, hundreds ships shown in high-speed and tihohodnye escorts, went through Northern Atlantic in a direction to the general for all to a place on coast of Northwest Africa. For desantirovanija at Algeria and Orana the majority of these ships should proceed through narrow strait of Gibraltar; on its coast there were batteries which at any moment could open fire. Other ships going directly from America, should go directly to Casablanca and to seaports to the north and the south from it.

The ships of these three basic caravans went in waters which teemed with German submarines. At Gibraltar the majority of escorts should enter into an operative range of enemy bombers. Our armies have been hastily trained such difficult landing operations, the majority of them at all had no fighting experience. Shortage of courts did not allow to take at once all armies and the combat material, necessary for maintenance of full success. And certainly, all it disturbed us.

Even our flight from England to Gibraltar was risky. We had to postpone time of a start because of nasty weather conditions twice. Before at last to rise in air, the officer ordering "flying fortresses", intended for a transfer of our group to Gibraltar, has purposely put me before necessity to make the decision, to take off or not to take off. It was a unique case in my life when I have appeared in such position as the decision of the aviation commander is usually definitive. All it seemed far not favorable primetoj^nakanune the huge enterprise, but to us does not remain anything other how to pass and this test. We flied at height. When the huge rock of Gibraltar has started to appear at last in an easy fog, my pilot has noticed: "It is the first case in my practice, when I should gain height to sit down on a runway in the end of long flight!"

Being in Gibraltar, we already planned the activity after successful disembarkation of landings, including the prompt transfer of our staff to Algeria. A lack of the future problems was not, but each of them could be solved only under condition of success of initial phases desantirovanija. Thus, our thoughts and conversations inevitably again and again came back to the direct decision of this primary goal.

We waited three days. At last there were head ships at night and began to pass through narrow passage, and we stood on the blacked out capes and looked, how they go by us. Still any messages on attacks of submarines or aircraft of the opponent! In us krepla hope, that the opponent, adhering to tactics which it in the past applied against the escorts following to Malta, will hold the air, underwater and surface forces concentrated to the east from island Sicily, anticipating drawing of powerful blows on the ships when those will approach to narrow pass between Sicily and the African coast.

In initial plans possibility to face exclusively heavy weather conditions at Casablanca was one of those reasons which forced me to agree with a reluctance on sending there the largest operative group. Cancellation threat desantirovanija last minute near Casablanca was quite real and if it happens there would be only two possibilities.

The first consisted in ordering to this huge escort to postpone desantirovanie and simply to go on a circle to the sea near to coast in expectation of an opportunity. Such variant had many lacks. First, the suddenness element in this area would be completely lost; secondly, the ships would appear under the threat of blows from submarines of the opponent which teemed in bay of Biscay; thirdly, substantially oslabla visibility of overwhelming power if will not be simultaneous desantirovanija in areas of all three ports. And at last, stocks of fuel at the ships are not boundless. By the second variant it was provided to spend all western escort to Mediterranean sea not to crowd in and without that already overflowed port of Gibraltar. Here the escort could protect the fuel and to be ready to go to Casablanca for desantirovanija as it was originally planned, or to land armies after the first landing at Orana and then to direct them along the railway in a northwest direction. Neither that, nor other variant did not represent the successful decision as each of them demanded fast revision and change of plans which realisation have already started. However the probability law specified that we should accept one of these possibilities.

By the evening the day before desantirovanija reports on the weather, received from one of our submarines around Casablanca, were gloomy, and I have made the preliminary decision: if conditions do not improve, to reorient the western escort on Gibraltar. It seriously would upset all our plans, but it would be better, rather than aimlessly to rush in ocean waters, dodging from enemy submarines.

Never for all war I felt such simplification as when next morning has received the short message, that conditions on the sea at Casablanca have developed not too bad and desantirovanie goes according to the plan. I have created a gratitude pray; my strong fears have dissipated.

Unexpected difficulties have arisen with a radio communication. At the first stages of operations the allied staff should rely exclusively on a radio communication with the operative groups following to specified areas for desantirovanija, and we hardly was have not come to confusion, having found out, that our radio communication works badly, and sometimes absolutely refuses. These troubles were attributed mainly to an overload of communication channels by our staff ships and in a communication centre in Gibraltar. However, what were the reasons, I have decided to translate our staff to the African continent as soon as possible.

The first report on contact with the opponent was distressing. The ship of the Navies of the USA "Thomas Stone", following as a part of an escort to Algeria and having onboard strengthened American battalion, has been torpedoed on November, 7th all in 150 miles from destination. Details in the report were not informed, but possibility of rather essential losses in people was not excluded. Till now in this respect to us surprisingly carried, but it did not reduce trouble for destiny of people by the ship. That evening we and have not received any additional data on destiny of people, however later it became known, that incident has ended safely. Losses have appeared small, and the ship has received not so heavy damages. However soldiers and officers, not wishing easy to wait, when them will tow off in any port, with enthusiasm have supported the decision of the commander to sit down in boats and on them to try to reach in due time to a place desantirovanija. But begun by the end of day strong excitement on the sea has not allowed them to carry out courageous intention, and it was necessary to take them aboard destroyers and other ships ohranenija and eventually to put ashore with delay approximately at 20 o'clock. Fortunately, absence of this strengthened battalion has not rendered essential influence on an operation course.

This very day, on November, 7th, I have carried on the most distressing negotiations for all war.

As of London and Washington have been sincerely convinced, that general Zhiro could result Frenchmen "the North Africa in camp of allies, in October we through Merfi have started negotiations to get out the general of Southern France where he, in essence, was in custody on purpose. Carefully thought over plan has been developed by our French friends and Merfi which has returned to Africa after secret visit to London. General Zhiro through reliable intermediaries kept informed podgotovljaemogo runaway. Despite vigilance of Germans and vishistov, in due time it has appeared on coast, villages to a small boat and under cover of night darkness has gone on a meeting with the English submarine which was in coastal waters under command of the captain of 1 rank of the American Naval Forces of Dzheralda Right. It with the big work has found general Zhiro in the sea. In other appointed place this submarine has met.s With one of our hydroplans, and on him the general with three personal assistants and group of staff officers has departed to my staff in second half of day on November, 7th. This episode stated here it is short, actually was a fascinating story full of extraordinary dramatic nature.

General Zhiro even in a civil dress looked the present military man. Growth more than six foots, a straight line, with a firm bearing and sharp in conversation and manners, it was courageous, though also a little tired person. However the tests transferred by it including long stay in imprisonment, have not tamed its fighting spirit.

It was very soon found out, that general Zhiro has arrived from France in deep error: he thought, that will immediately take up command of all forwarding forces of allies. Having entered into my dark office, it was presented to me in such role. I could not accept its services on such conditions. I wanted, that it has left to Africa as soon as we can guarantee its safety, and there has incurred command of those French forces which will voluntary rally round it. We wished to have it on our party first of all at heart constantly were afraid to appear involved in long and serious war against Frenchmen which not only strongly would afflict us and would upset all plans, but also would cause a damage of all our campaign against Germans.

General Zhiro remained is unshakable; he considered, that its honour and honour of its country and consequently, possibly, could not take up in this enterprise a post more low, than a post of the commander-in-chief is mentioned. But it was impossible. Purpose of the allied commander-in-chief — procedure difficult, demanding a consensus of military and political leaders of the corresponding governments. Any subordinate commander of forwarding forces would not find a legal substantiation to obey to the orders proceeding from general Zhiro. Moreover, at present as a part of allied forwarding forces there was no Frenchman; the opponent if that has appeared, could be. Frenchmen.

All it has been in detail explained the general. He has been shaken, disappointed and after meetings lasting many hours has found necessary to reject any participation in this enterprise. He has told: "General Zhiro cannot agree with the subordinated position in this command; my compatriots, and my honour as the soldier, it would appear soiled" would not understand it. It was necessary to regret sincerely only for it has left in France the family as potential hostages in hands of raging Germans, and if will join us, subjected to huge risk.

My political advisers at that time were Frimen Mettjus from the American State department and William Mak from the English Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They have been so concerned by such course of events that have suggested to appoint nominally general Zhiro the commander, and for me to save the actual power on a management of operations. They considered, that public joining of a name of general Zhiro to this operation quite could mean its success. I could not agree with it and have decided to adhere to a line, that if general Zhiro will not want to head those French forces in the North Africa which, probably, will come over to our party in struggle against Germany we should conduct campaign as if we never met and did not confer with it. Negotiations with general Zhiro proceeded with breaks far for a midnight. I well enough understood the French language, but nevertheless have insisted on that in order to avoid any wrong understanding nearby there was an official translator. When more skilled translators have already exhausted, general Clark has offered the services. And though he spoke in French far not fluently, negotiations proceeded smoothly enough. The matter is that after the first hour of these negotiations each of us simply again and again repeated the already stated arguments. When at last general Zhiro has gone to sleep, was not the slightest signs of change in its initial requirements. Leaving, he has noticed, that in this business will be the observer. However he has agreed to meet me next morning in the house the governor general. That evening persons of politicians at our staff were extended.

Before to leave to have a rest after difficult day, I have directed the detailed report on our negotiations to the Incorporated Anglo-American staff. I was grateful for the immediate answer from this staff in which me completely supported. The final phrase of the answer has appeared deformed, but all of us could read the following: "... We regret, that you have been compelled to devote so a lot of your time to this business..." It is good, that I could not expect, what is the time at me will leave forthcoming weeks on irritating and vain meetings on the North African political problems!

Fortunately, night rest has a little changed mood of general Zhiro, and next morning at a meeting he has declared, that will participate in operation in that role what we offered it. I have given the promise, that if he achieves support of Frenchmen, I will deal with it as with the manager of this region before possibility to reveal will of the population will be presented to the civil authorities.

During the further negotiations with general Zhiro the full divergence in sights of that it was necessary to make in the strategic plan during that moment was found out. Its point of view was reduced to immediately to attack Southern France, not paying any attention to the North Africa. I explained to it, that our armies already landed in the planned points of the North African coast, that we could not provide aviation support for a landing which he offered, that allies had at that time no enough of courts to spend necessary escalating of forces for intrusion in the south of France which would sustain pressure upon them from Germans. At last, I have explained to it, that this campaign is undertaken on the basis of such difficult and in details developed plans, that their change what offers ZHiro, is completely excluded.

He could not understand, why we should have in our hands the North Africa as base, why armies of allies should locate firmly and strongly in this region before to carry out successful intrusion into a southern part of Europe. He did not imagine sense of lessons which were given by war, concerning influence of aircraft of land basing on the sea vessels not protected from air and the ships. Possibly, he has not understood in the tactical plan of value of loss in a southwest part of Pacific ocean of two large English ships "the Prince Welsh" and "Ripals" when them have left not protected from blows of aircraft of land basing. Moreover, ZHiro considered, that if allies have chosen a variant of disembarkation in the south of Europe, they could deliver to the south of France of 500 thousand soldiers within two or three weeks. It was difficult to it to understand, that we have undertaken operation which has demanded limiting pressure of our resources, and that owing to insufficiency of these resources we should calculate our initial strategic targets carefully.

Within night and early morning the operative reports encouraging on the tone on November, 8th arrived. Predictably, at disembarkation in Algeria our armies have not met almost any resistance. It has occurred mainly thanks to efforts Merfi, operating through the general of the French army Drudgery, and to liking to allies from the general of Gigolo Zhjuena though outwardly last showed official animosities.

However we were not left by thought of necessity as soon as possible to leave in area of Tunis. On the night of November, 8th I have outlined a pencil a memorandum in which it was spoken: "In east sector we have slowed down rates of advancement, and we should go immediately in a direction to the Check, Bizerte".

At Orana our armies were successfully put ashore, however Frenchmen, in particular divisions of their Navies, have rendered fierce resistance. In this fight the American 1st division to which should pass subsequently a long fighting way, has received here baptism of fire. Despite weak about-uchennost staff, 1st division at support of parts of 1st armoured division has achieved solving success, and on November, 9th we already knew, that we will soon have possibility to report on a victory in this area. On November, 10th resistance at Orana has completely stopped. Generals Fridendoll and Terri de la Mesa Allen with honour have passed the first fighting test.

We also knew, that at the western coast of an army have landed successfully, but further from them reports have ceased to arrive. However, on some sites, especially at Port-liotej, fierce fights were developed. The calmness period by the treacherous sea lasted very short time, and the subsequent delivery of reinforcements has been interfaced to exclusively serious difficulties. I tried to use any possible means to establish connection with commanders on the western site rear admiral Hjuittom and general Pattonom. The radio communication has again given up, and we were reached only by illegible signals. We tried to direct for communication to area of Casablanca easy bombers, but after the French fighters have brought down a little from them, it became clear, that this variant is hopeless. In despair I have asked an admiral Caen-ninghema, whether there is no at it a high-speed ship. Fortunately, in the Gibraltar port during that moment there was one of the most high-speed ships, lifting steams to deliver to Malta the cargo extremely necessary there, and an admiral has without hesitation suggested to use to me this ship for an establishment of communication with command of the western operative group. I have appointed American rear admiral Bernharda Bi-eri to head group of staff officers by the ship, and within an hour the group left in the sea.

In the morning on November, 9th general Clark and general Zhiro have taken off for Algeria, hoping to enter into any agreement with the French authorities. It was necessary to achieve the termination by Frenchmen of operations and to secure with their help in planned operations against Germans.

The cool welcome of general Zhiro Frenchmen in the North Africa was terrifying blow on our hopes. The general completely ignored. It has broadcast, declaring, that incurs a management of the North Africa, and has instructed the French forces to stop fights against allies, but its reference has not rendered any influence. I doubt, that many Frenchmen heard its performance. The radio communication with Algeria was still supported with the big difficulties, but the message eventually has come: admiral Darlan is in Algeria!

We have excluded at once possibility of that it has arrived there, in advance knowing about our intentions or having desire to help with realisation of the plan conceived by us. Received in Orane and Algeria data testified that our intrusion was full and stunning unexpectedness for each soldier and each inhabitant of the North Africa, except for those very much few people who actively helped us. But even it has not been inform exact date of intrusion. Does not remain any doubts, that Darlan it has appeared here absolutely casually; and it is valid, it has arrived here in connection with heavy illness of the son which very much liked.

In person Darlana we had the commander-in-chief the French forces battling against us. Its arrest would be the simple and easy answer. However Gift-lan had the right to give necessary orders still to very strong French fleet which was then in Toulon and Dakar, and we had at once a hope to reduce potential threat from this fleet on Mediterranean sea and to receive desirable addition to our own surface forces. Before most my start from England Churchill has sincerely noticed: "If I could meet Darlana though I and hate it, I with pleasure would creep in a lap the whole mile if this most could convince Darlana to result its fleet in structure of allied forces".

However we had also other, more urgent reason to try to use position Darlana. During negotiations with the French military men and civilians general Clark has very soon found out the traditional requirement of Frenchmen to create any legal cover to any actions which they can undertake. This cover was for military men than-tb like an amulet; their capitulation in 1940, they confirmed, was simply the certificate of loyalty of the soldiers who have obeyed to lawful orders of the civil heads.

French commander everyone without an exception with whom general Clark had exhaustive conversations, refused to undertake any actions for transition with the armies on the party of allies while it will not receive on that the lawful order. Each of them has taken the oath on fidelity to marshal Petenu which name at that time made deeper impact on thinking and acts of people in the North Africa, than something another. All officers considered, that they cannot be released from this oath or give the order to another about cease-fire if corresponding instructions from admiral Darlana are not received, their lawful commander on whom they looked as at the direct and personal representative of marshal Petena.

Then and within many next days was useless to talk to the Frenchman, be it military or civil, first of all not recognising absolute authority of marshal Petena. In all houses the portrait of the marshal in a prominent place hung, and in public places these portraits have been hung out in a frame of endurances from its speeches and statements. Any prebed - nie was comprehensible, if only "the marshal of it wants".

General Clark wired, that without Darlana no reconciliation is impossible and that this point of view is supported also by general Zhiro who at that time was in secret shelter in Algeria. Clark all time informed me on a course of these negotiations, how much it was possible to it, but it was clear, that he experiences serious difficulties in the efforts to convince Frenchmen to stop fights with our armies. Being it is dealt with by all these problems, I have received the dispatch from the chief of the staff which has temporarily remained in London in which he noticed, that, in view of the reached initial successes and quite clear outcome of operation "Torch", to it the offer from highest authorities that we have stopped the planned escalating of forces for operations in the North Africa has arrived and have started the decision of other strategic problems. By the end of war I have got used to this tendency shown at separate figures in deep back, to overestimate initial successes and to dismiss the future difficulties. However at present this dispatch has discomposed me, and I have quickly outlined the answer from which I result endurance:

"Resolutely against reduction of the forces planned for operation"Torch". Conditions have not taken shape yet. On the contrary, in Tunis position dangerous. The country completely is not pacified, communications get vital importance, and two basic ports in the North Africa are blocked. Each effort undertaken for the purpose of maintenance of organised and effective cooperation of Frenchmen, encounters an interlacing of political and personal intrigues, and actually there is a certain impression, that nobody wishes to be at war, sincerely to co-operate with us.

Instead of conversations on possible reduction we should search for ways and means for the prompt escalating of forces to clear the North Africa. On strategic questions we should plan on the future regularly, but, for God's sake, let's finish one business, not starting others simultaneously. We have lost many courts for last three days, and maintenance of escorts with air cover remains the extremely difficult business. German threat vmeshate - lstva through Spain has not disappeared. I am not afraid of phantoms and I do not lift a false alarm. I simply insist here on what: if the business begun by us looks encouraging just time to develop our efforts, instead of to weaken them. We have just started realisation of the huge enterprise. The good beginning should not be undermined acceptance on itself nothing of the proved obligations ".

That day, on November, 12th, general Clark has informed, that Darlan, obviously, is the unique Frenchman who could provide to us cooperation in the North Africa. I have understood, that this question demanded fast settlement on a place. Its transfer for the decision in Washington and London would lead to inevitable delays, and at this time we should pay off with the big blood, and we would lose chances of agreement achievement peace by to switch on the French armies in structure of our forwarding forces.

We already had written orders from our governments about cooperation with any French administration what we will find at the moment of our introduction into Africa. Moreover, at present this question was purely military. If final political consequences get so serious character that there would be a necessity to sacrifice someone and traditions all the same would demand the logician from the commander in fight to assume overall responsibility for the actions. For the committed errors me could remove from a post, but I have been convinced, that only the fast decision of this question could save essential unity of efforts of two people and timely achievement of the military purposes.

We have soberly and fairly discussed all possibilities, remembering thus, that basic orders demanded from us to go to Africa, to get there the ally, instead of to kill Frenchmen.

I well understood, that any transaction with vishistom will call the strongest indignation of those people in England and America which do not know severe realities of war; therefore I have decided to limit the decision of a question to especially local military aspects. Taking with myself of admiral Kanninghema, on November, 13th I have taken off for Algeria and after the arrival there at once have begun meeting with general Clark and the American consul general in this area Merfi. It was my first meeting with Merfi since time of its secret visit to London several weeks ago.

They have in details reported on all events which were taking place recently. On November, 10th Darlan has directed to all French commanders the order to stop fights with allied armies. Peten from Vichy immediately declared this order void and has discharged Gift-lana of a post. Then Darlan has decided to cancel the order, however Clark has not allowed it to make it. Then in Algeria the message, that has been received. Germans have intruded in Southern France, and now Darlan has declared, that as Germans have broken conditions of an armistice of 1940, it is ready to co-operate with Americans. Meanwhile general Zhiro in the beginning shaken by that local Frenchmen have not followed it, has come to belief, that Darlan — the unique French official in this region which can incline the North Africa on the party of allies. When Germans have entered Southern France, ZHiro has gone to Gift-lanu to offer the cooperation. Battle near Casablanca by order of Darlana has stopped, in other places fights have ended even before receipt there this order. The French officers who openly helped us, including generals Betuar and Maet, were temporarily in disgrace; they were powerless something to make.

After the exhaustive review of all conditions Merfi has told: "All question has turned now to purely military problem. And you will need to give on it the answer".

When we have come nearer to the definitive decision of this problem, it has completely departed aside and only sometimes acted in a role of the translator. I have appeared before necessity to define, that it was more important for armies of allies: to conclude an armistice (and by that to win time and to save a life of many soldiers and somewhat quicker to develop real conditions of cooperation with Frenchmen) or simply to arrest Darlana. This certificate would for certain be accompanied by continuation of operations and the further strengthening of animosities between Frenchmen and allies. Local French officials nevertheless formally were officials of the neutral country, and while our governments did not show readiness to declare France war, we did not have any legal or other rights despotically, in nazi style, to create here a puppet government at the desire.

The reached agreement has been then fixed by the special document in which the help of Frenchmen to allied armies was in general defined. According to this document, the commander-in-chief allied armies on friendly, neokkupirovannoj gave all necessary legal rights and privileges for realisation of a management by armies and fighting operations. To us unobstructed use of ports, railways and other constructions was guaranteed.

Allies simply ascertained, that if the French armies and civilians will obey to orders Darlana on military cooperation ^ them they will not stir to realisation of the French administrative control over the North Africa. On the contrary, they confirmed the intention to co-operate with Frenchmen in business of maintenance of an order. In the document there were no obligations for our governments concerning any political recognition of local administration, and Darlan was simply authorised on the basis of the voluntary consent of local officials and under the arrangement with us to take in hand the French affairs in the North Africa while we will be occupied by clarification from Germans of this continent. He also has agreed to put our friend to general Zhiro at the head of all French military forces in Sowing-ro-western to Africa.

The important circumstance was that we could not carry out military occupation for what we would need to stop any actions against "axis" powers. The Arabian population then sympathetically concerned the French mode of Vichy which has deprived of Jews of any rights in this region, and revolt of Arabs against us which Germans definitely would try to provoke, would be for us catastrophic. Our intention consisted in catching the North Africa only as base for continuation of war against Hitler. Legally our position in Africa differed from our subsequent status on island Sicily as well as the status in Sicily differed from our position in Italy and later in Germany. Theoretically we were in the country of the ally. Actual aim obligations Darlana it was reduced recognising for us dominating influence in this region. But we should use such influence was able to avoid unpleasant complications.

In the French armies to orders Darlana submitted, contrary to neglect with which were perceived made before statements of general Zhiro. Darlan has stopped fights at the western coast where armies of the United States already concentrated against defensive boundaries at Casablanca and prepared for the general storm. Experience of general Pattona in Morocco prompted, what is it would pour out in bloody fight.

The definitive agreement with representatives of the French military forces headed Darlanom, has been reached in Algeria on November, 13th. Admiral Kanninghemu and me had to come back to Gibraltar in the evening in bad weather. We long turned over airdrome in full darkness, doing vain attempts to plant the plane. I did not see an exit from this inconvenient position and all thought that to our pilot, the young lieutenant, it is necessary to rely more on the ability, than on devices to carry out safe planting which hardly eventually managed to be made.

This case has accelerated performance before the decision made by me to transfer our staff to Algeria. It has called a panic the officer of a communication service who has told, that it cannot provide communication in Algeria before New year. But we have moved there on November, 23rd.

Certainly, we periodically represented official reports on all political problems to our two governments. Nevertheless immediately begun criticism in a press of two countries has got so strong character that has compelled both the president, and the prime minister to request from us fuller explanation. They have received it in the form of the long telegramme, which distance wide circulation among government officials in Washington and London. Even after long retrospective studying of those conditions I could add a little now to this explanation. I here quote it, only having paraphrased offers according to requirements of preservation of secret of a code:

"On November, 14th.
Completely I understand surprise in London and Washington that turn which was accepted by negotiations with Frenchmen in the North Africa. Moods existing here among Frenchmen even otdalenno mismatch our calculations by which we were guided before. The facts stated more low have the direct relation to a question being, and in this case it is important, that any hasty actions at us, houses, have not broken that balance which to us was possible to achieve here...

The name of marshal Petena represents here something such with what it is necessary to be considered. Everyone tries to make impression, that he lives and operates in a shade of the marshal. Civil and military heads agree that only one person has the right to operate on behalf of the marshal in the North Africa. It Darlan. Even ZHiro which was our entrusted adviser and the firm friend since time of the first meetings with it in which result it has been compelled to reconcile with reality, recognised this reason dominating and according to it has changed the intentions.

Resistance which we have faced in the beginning, has been rendered on the basis of belief of Frenchmen of all ranks, that such is desire of the marshal. For this reason ZHiro it seems to them guilty at least in certain infringement of a subordination when he insisted not to render resistance to our disembarkation to coast. General Zhiro understands it and, apparently, partly sympathises with general mood. All whom it concerns, say, that are ready to help us provided that Darlan will tell what to do, but they do not wish to follow the instructions proceeding from someone of another. Admiral Esteva in Tunis declares, that will obey to orders Darlana. Noges has stopped battle in Morocco by order of Darlana. Therefore in these questions it is impossible to avoid a recognition of position Darlana...

The agreement essence consists that Frenchmen will make everything, that can to help us to grasp Tunis. Group Darlana will adjust effective cooperation and will begin under the guidance of ZHiro reorganisation of separate military units for their participation in war. This group uses any possibility to receive the fleet standing at Toulon. We will support this group in questions of a country government and its pacification, and also in equipment of the selected parts. Details are still discussed...

Our hope of fast capture of Tunis and reception here supports from the population cannot be carried out, the general agreement in those frameworks which we have just defined with Darlanom and other officials supervising the administrative mechanism of region and tribes in Morocco will not be accepted yet. ZHiro now understands, that it can make nothing even at support of allies. It with pleasure has accepted a post of the military chief in group Darlana. He considers, that now his name should not be mentioned, there will not pass yet some days. Without a strong French management we should go on military occupation here. Loss of time and expenses of resources would appear huge. General Patton considers, that only in Morocco it would be required 60 thousand allied armies to hold tribes in calmness. Taking into consideration that effect which would be rendered by excitements of tribes to Spain, you can present yourselves, what at us here problems ".

Never in a current of long negotiations Darlan has told confidentially, that he can achieve transition of the Toulon fleet to our party. He thought, that, probably, because of shortage of fuel, and also because of confusion and uncertainty which, certainly, will be established in Southern France, the commander of fleet actually will not try to deduce fleet in the sea and to join us, but he has declared with all conviction, that the French admiral vtulone never will admit, that its ships have come into the hands of Germans. He repeated it again and again, and the followed events have confirmed, what is it and was.

On the other hand, Darlan admiral Esteva ordering the French forces in Tunis has been assured, that, will join other Frenchmen in the North Africa, observing any orders, whatever it has given. Duration of negotiations in Algeria undermined this our big hope. This circumstance called uncertainty admiral Esteva who, being is informed on character occurring then negotiations in Algeria, received also orders from Vichy to show resistance to allies and as to us spoke, to start up Germans in area subordinated to it. Military heads in that region, generals Kelts in Algeria and Barra in Tunis, were in the same status of indecision, and general Kelts as informed us, was certain against any agreement with allies.

In these conditions of doubts and indecision of Frenchmen Germans have started to land around Tunis.

The first contingent of German armies has arrived there by air in the afternoon on November, 9th. From this time they aspired to deliver as soon as possible here reinforcements, and by then when the temporal agreement with Darlanom in Algeria has been reached, admiral Esteva any more had no possibility to operate independently. During last telephone conversation between it and the French official in Algeria he has told: "Now I have a trustee". We it have apprehended that Germans actually already held its hostage as a hint. Along with it generals Kelts and Barra have without hesitation obeyed to orders Darlana. The first, in particular, became further the perfect fighting commander in allied armies.

After reception of my telegramme in London and Washington both governments informed me, that will support the arrangement reached by us until its conditions will be honesty carried out by Frenchmen and while operations in Africa will not come to an end.

This arrangement, of course, absolutely differed from that on what we counted, still being in London. However our governments were mistaken not only concerning strong personalities and their influence in the North Africa, but also in an estimation of moods among local population. They believed, that Frenchmen in this region are extremely revolted by vishistsko-nazi domination and with open arms will meet as deliverers any forces of allies which will manage to become stronger in this country. The first German bombardment of Algeria, and them was much, has proved an inaccuracy of such assumption. Certainly, there there were many patriots, and after a victory in Tunis their number has increased, but those first days of our risky position and night enemy bombardments the latent mood on which constantly reported on me, was put into words: " What for you have brought this war to us? We were happy with the life, and now you have come here that all of us have killed ". In the last report written already after end of campaign, the general the Anderson has noted the following about these initial moods of local residents:

"Many mayors, chiefs of stations and mails, and also other officials on key posts with whom we dealt in process of advancement of our armies (for example, civil telephone lines were in the beginning my basic communication facility with the advanced parts and a staff of allied aircraft), treated us coldly and did not dare to join openly, and some have been simply with hostility adjusted. As a whole I can tell with confidence, that at the beginning in army the senior officers fluctuated and afraid to connect themselves with allies, and younger officers basically tended to support of allied armies. Soldiers submitted to orders; among the Arabian part of the population indifference or animosities was shown, Frenchmen treated favourably, but is apathetic. I had a belief, that safety of my small isolated grouping would not be provided, if I have suffered in fight serious failure".

Such moods differed radically from opinion of our governmental circles considering, that the people of the North Africa at occurrence there allied armies will unanimously rise against vishistov, nazis being under the control.

As a result of acceptance Darlanom of administrative management in the North Africa and its influences in the French Western Africa the large centre Dakar has soon appeared in hands of allies. The old soldier lost a foot and hearing in the First World War and sincerely hating all German was the governor of the Western Africa Buasson. It has been fanatically betrayed France and considered as the core and a unique debt to save the French Western Africa for the French empire. A little earlier during this war it has beaten off attempts of English armies and forces "free Frenchmen" to land at Dakar, having declared, that will battle to any opponent who will dare to intrude on wards to it territory. However in connection with intrusion of Germans into Southern France he declared the readiness to obey to the military orders proceeding from me and passed it through admiral Darlana; anybody more he did not recognise.

As Dakar at that time was outside of my area of operations where and without that cares on campaign conducting, and also owing to that the English and American press showed serious trouble concerning military settlement which I have carried out with Darlanom sufficed me, I have reminded my chiefs, that maintenance of performance Buas-sonom of conditions of the general capitulation is not included into my duties and I in this business will not accept any participation if on that there will be no order. Nevertheless I have reported on them, that could address to heads in Dakar, and have informed them on statement Buassona. On it I have very soon received the instructions which essence was reduced to that I have provided transition of the West African region to the party of allies in the same way as I have made it in the North Africa.

My solving meeting with governor Buassonom bordered on a drama outcome. It was necessary to solve many the important details. In the Western Africa the big number of the English seamen who have landed there from the ships, sunk during war has been interned. Englishmen insisted on their immediate clearing, and Buasson put forward the counterrequirement, insisting on the termination of radio propagation which was conducted by "free Frenchmen" from the next areas bordering on the Western Africa. He said, that this propagation constantly accused its and its government of any crimes and called complications with local population. He insisted, that the English government has ordered to stop such propagation immediately. There were also other similar questions, however any of them did not find the reflexion in that document which needed to be signed. At meeting were present Darlan and other French officials, and also Merfi and some employees of my staff. In process of discussion excitation of its participants amplified, and it seemed, that all Frenchmen speak simultaneously. At last I have taken away governor Buassona a few understanding in English, in a corner personally to talk over with it, and have told to it about the following:

"The governor, I have no possibility to inform you in details, that namereno to make both English, and the American government. But I can tell with confidence the following: both my governments have allowed to me instructions to enter into with you the agreement on the general basis, that the French Western Africa will join the North Africa in war against"axis"powers. My governments have declared, that will not interfere with your local affairs. They expect from you the same cooperation, as from any other friendly region, and it involves immediate clearing of any of our citizens which can be interned in your area. They will try to stop any propagation which can be directed against you and your mode, and they, undoubtedly, use kind services that other co-operating organisations, including" free Frenchmen "under the guidance of the general de Gaulle, also have stopped this practice. However it is obvious, that in this question they cannot order to the general de to Gaulle. We wish to use air lines through your area and we wish, that you were on our party. Weeks that each of these small details to settle Be required, and we cannot waste time in vain. You will sign the agreement, and I assure you my honour of the soldier that I will make everything, that of human forces that the general agreements reached between us, were carried out on the basis of cooperation as that is wished by both my governments how we do it in the North Africa. While I am am held on this post by both my governments, you can be assured, that the spirit of our agreement will be never broken by allies ".

Not having told words, it has approached to my table and while in a room disputes proceeded, villages and has put the name under the agreement. As soon as he has signed, I have asked it: "the Governor when our planes can start to use airdrome at Dakar?" He has looked at me and has responded in French: "Just now". In further remarks Buasson underlined importance which it gave to my assurances as soldier to avoid unnecessary trouble of the French institutes in the Western Africa and to help reorganisation of the French army for its participation in war on our party. It was easy to be mistaken in an estimation of the French problem what it then was. Only the patience and persistence could bring to us valuable and finally the democratic ally. Violence and neglect feeling of advantage of Frenchmen we would not give anything, except dissonance and fair charges that too nazis.

In force of power of our weapon and a recognition of time French administration in the North Africa operations in all area to the west of Algeria by November, 12th have stopped.